Though the existential threat of AI agents is grabbing headlines, subsea cables represent a real-world ‘kill switch’ for the global AI economy. AI models and agentic inference require a continuous flow of data among hyperscale data centers, cloud providers, and enterprise customers, which is why the UN is being asked to focus not only on emerging fears about autonomous AI agents, but also the less-glamorous topic of subsea cables – their security and resilience.

The Trump administration has for the past year prioritized the building of redundant networks that can be resilient to foreign espionage, cyberattacks, and sabotage. In June, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a Second Report and Order (FCC 26-42) to overhaul its submarine cable landing license rules, tightening national security oversight over critical undersea telecommunications infrastructure and expanding the agency’s regulatory and oversight authority over submarine cable infrastructure. 

Some geopolitical analysts and international trade groups have criticized FCC Chairman Brendan Carr’s sweeping rules, which he says will “unleash submarine cable investment” and “accelerate the buildout of AI infrastructure.” They argue that recent fast-tracking of reviews might rush the careful examination necessary in complex global supply chains, possibly opening backdoors to untrusted third-parties and their equipment.

Supporters, on the other hand, have argued that the FCC’s review still involves direct collaboration with Team Telecom (the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector), and that the changes focus on rapidly building a highly redundant network that can be trusted by U.S. allies – something advocates say is safer than a sparse network marred by years of bureaucratic gridlock and red tape.

Other changes include the codification of  the “presumption of denial” to cable-landing licenses involving foreign adversaries like China and Russia – something that was historically protocol, but not codified as a formal legal default.

Some analysts have warned that a rapid decoupling of the submarine supply chain from entire countries (like China, Russia, and Iran) could lead to shortages of critical components, as well as higher buildout costs, and compromised engineering standards. But, FCC leadership, national security officials, and various lawmakers have argued that separating critical communications infrastructure from foreign adversaries is a matter of existential national security and economic survival.

With these and other debates take shape, the issue of multilateral resilience and international law will be a focus of the UN and its International Telecommunication Union (ITU) – especially issues of standardized permitting, security vetting, and jurisdictional gaps under current international maritime law.